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CONVICTIONS OF UNINCLUDED LESSER
OFFENSES: INFORMAL AMENDMENTS
AND PLEA BARGAINS
A person cannot be convicted of an offense (other than a
necessarily included offense) not charged against him by indict-
ment or information, whether or not there was evidence at his trial
to show that he had committed the offense.1
A person may not be punished for a crime without a formal
and sufficient accusation even if he voluntarily submits to the ju-
risdiction of the court ... 2
This principle-that a criminal defendant cannot be convicted,
upon a verdict rendered by either judge or jury, of a crime not alleged
nor necessarily included in a formal accusatory pleading against him-
has traditionally been propounded by both courts and commentators
as a fundamental legal concept. 3 Not surprisingly, it appears that
many practitioners are still unaware of the incursions into that doctrine
in California. Appellate courts, however, have had frequent occasion
to consider "informal amendment of the pleadings,"4 the designation
accorded the process whereby an accused is convicted of an offense
neither charged nor necessarily included within a formal accusation;
for example, conviction of breaking or removing vehicle parts without
1. In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171, 174-75, 288 P.2d 5, 7 (1955).
2. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 8 (1926) (dictum). "Such is the un-
disputed law in all jurisdictions .... " People v. Zolotoff, 48 Cal. App. 2d 360, 366,
119 P.2d 745, 748 (1941).
3. See, e.g., In re Bramble, 31 Cal. 2d 43, 187 P.2d 411 (1947), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 960 (1949) (dictum); People v. Smith, 136 Cal. 207, 68 P. 702 (1902); Peo-
ple v. Warren, 223 Cal. App. 2d 798, 36 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1963); People v. Akens,
25 Cal. App. 373, 143 P. 795 (1914).
4. People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 450 P.2d 591, 75 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1969);
People v. Ramos, 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 101 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1972); In re Stanley B.,
17 Cal. App. 3d 530, 95 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1971); People v. Chavira, 3 Cal. App. 3d
988, 83 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1970); People v. Rasher, 3 Cal. App. 3d 798, 83 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1970); People v. Taylor, 273 Cal. App. 2d 477, 78 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1969); People
v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965); People v. Hensel, 233
Cal. App. 2d 834, 43 Cal. Rptr. 865, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 942 (1965); see People
v. Dorsey, 25 Cal. App. 3d 366, 101 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1972); People v. Rosechlaub,
21 Cal. App. 3d 874, 98 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1971); People v. Calder, 6 Cal. App. 3d
931, 86 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1970); People v. Wright, 272 Cal. App. 2d 53, 76 Cal. Rptr.
859 (1969); People v. Mayes, 262 Cal. App. 2d 195, 68 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1968); People
v. Blunt, 241 Cal. App. 2d 200, 50 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1966).
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the owner's consent, upon a charge of attempted grand theft.5 A like
variation of the conventional rule limiting pleas of guilty to charges
formally alleged, or crimes included therein," has also appeared in Cali-
fornia, expanding the scope of acceptable pleas to encompass "related
offenses."'  Unfortunately, neither of these judicially created devia-
tions from the traditional concepts has been adequately explained by
the courts.
This note will (1) describe the standard "formal" California pro-
cedures relevant to "informal amendment" and "related offense"
pleas, (2) examine the new principles as to purpose, scope, applica-
tion, and difficulties, and (3) propose a legislative solution to some of




The California Constitution' and the Penal Code' provide that
public offenses triable in the superior courts must be prosecuted by
indictment or information, with limited exceptions specified in the stat-
utes.' °  An indictment, brought by a grand jury," may charge any
offenses for which reasonable or probable cause is adduced by evi-
dence before that body.'12  An information, drawn by the district attor-
ney, 13 may contain only crimes for which such cause is shown by
the evidence at a preliminary hearing. '4  It is important to observe,
however, that failure to make a timely objection to a defective or im-
proper pleading 15 may result in a waiver of such potential challenges. 16
Procedural rules relating to amendment of accusatory pleadings' 7
contain similar limiting provisions. Indictments may not be amended
so as to change the offense charged,'8 nor informations so as to show
offenses not appearing in the evidence at the preliminary examina-
5. People v. Dorsey, 25 Cal. App. 3d 366, 101 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1972).
6. See, e.g., People v. Whitlow, 113 Cal. App. 2d 804, 249 P.2d 35 (1952);
People v. Titus, 85 Cal. App. 413, 259 P. 465 (1927).
7. People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
8. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
9. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 682, 737 (West 1970).
10. Id. at § 682.
11. See generally id. at §§ 737, 889, 917-23.
12. Id. at §§ 939.6-.8, 944.
13. See generally id. at §§ 737-39, 949-73.
14. Id. at § 739. See also id. at § 860 (procedure relating to the filing of an
information following the waiver of preliminary examination).
15. Id. § 995.
16. Id. at § 996.
17. Id. at § 1009.
18. See, e.g., People v. Wallach, 79 Cal. App. 605, 608, 250 P. 578, 579 (1926)
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tion' 9 and relating to the transaction upon which the order of commit-
ment was made. 20  Once again, however, an unchallenged impro-
priety, though altering the pleadings beyond the permissible scope of
amendment, is waived and cannot be raised on appeal.21
Courts have often asserted that the "purpose" of a formal accu-
satory pleading is to provide the defendant with notice of the offense
charged and an opportunity to prepare a defense thereon, 22 in order
that he not be taken by surprise at his trial; indeed, constitutional due
process so requires." The provisions governing criminal pleadings
and amendments, as well as the entire simplified procedure under the
Penal Code, are clearly attuned to this "notice concept."24  In num-
erous instances wherein the sufficiency of a particular pleading has
been challenged, the courts have merely inquired into the essential fair-
ness of the notice provided by the information conveyed to the
defendant in the indictment or information.
25
It has been posited, however, that a valid accusatory pleading in
some form, alleging the commission of a cognizable criminal offense,
is a jurisdictional prerequisite without which a court cannot proceed in
any manner.26  Although it seems manifest that subject matter juris-
(dictum), indicating that, indeed, the statute could not constitutionally authorize such
an amendment, in view of the traditional sanctity accorded the grand jury function.
19. See, e.g., People v. Kellin, 209 Cal. App. 2d 574, 576, 25 Cal. Rptr. 925,
927 (1962) (such an amendment would be contrary to CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 8).
20. Parks v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 609, 241 P.2d 521 (1952).
21. People v. Collins, 217 Cal. App. 2d 310, 313, 31 Cal. Rptr. 587, 589 (1963);
People v. Workman, 121 Cal. App. 2d 533, 263 P.2d 458 (1953) (applying CAL. PEN.
CODE H9 995-96 (West 1970) to amendments).
22. E.g., United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953); People v. Ma-
honey, 145 Cal. 104, 107, 78 P. 354, 355 (1904); People v. Barry, 153 Cal. App. 2d
193, 202, 314 P.2d 531, 536-37 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958); People v.
Beesly, 119 Cal. App. 82, 84, 6 P.2d 114, 115 (1931); cf. People v. Antoine, 180 Cal.
App. 2d 786, 790, 4 Cal. Rptr. 589, 592 (1960) (sole purpose of accusatory pleading);
People v. Massey, 151 Cal. App. 2d 623, 648, 312 P.2d 365, 380 (1957).
23. E.g., People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 612, 477 P.2d 409, 419, 91 Cal. Rptr.
385, 395 (1970), quoting In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171, 175, 288 P.2d 5, 7 (1955);
accord, Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334
(1941) ("real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most
universally recognized requirement of due process").
24. CAL. PEN. CODE H9 948-73 (West 1970).
25. See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 40 Cal. 2d 483, 254 P.2d 501 (1953); People
v. Pierce, 14 Cal. 2d 639, 96 P.2d 784 (1939); People v. Barry, 153 Cal. App. 2d
193, 314 P.2d 531 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958); People v. Quinn, 94
Cal. App. 2d 112, 210 P.2d 280 (1949); cf. CAL. PEN. CODE H§ 952, 959-60 (West
1970).
26. E.g., Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 8 (1927) (dictum); Rogers v.
Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 7, 291 P.2d 929, 931 (1955), quoting, Greenberg v. Su-
perior Court, 19 Cal. 2d 319, 321, 121 P.2d 713, 715 (1942); People v. Zolotoff, 48
Cal. App. 2d 360, 366, 119 P.2d 745, 748 (1941).
diction, though actually vested in a court by the constitution or the
legislature, must be exercised by means of a pleading filed in a court
competent to hear and determine the case, 27 the effect of actions be-
yond the authorized scope of a court's power in a particular cause,
once such general jurisdiction has been invoked, is less certain. Such
activity, which has been termed "in excess of jurisdiction '"2s (as op-
posed to "in absence of jurisdiction"), will be considered in detail be-
low. 29
The Confusion of Included Crimes
The doctrine of necessarily included lesser offenses3 ° is complex
and often misunderstood by judges and attorneys alike, and a thorough
analysis of the concept is well beyond the scope of the present discus-
sion."' For our purposes, it will suffice to observe that two basic defi-
nitions are applied in California, both of which have been held to sat-
isfy due process requirements by fulfilling the "notice" function re-
ferred to previously.
The traditional statement of the standard is that when all of the
elements of the corpus delicti of the lesser offense are included in
the elements of the greater, such that the latter cannot be committed
without necessarily committing the former, the lesser is necessarily in-
cluded in the greater.32 Further, the lesser must not only be part
of the greater in fact, but must also be "embraced within the legal
definition of the greater as a part thereof." 3
The more recent expansion of this concept drew upon the fact
that earlier cases had used the term "legal definition," rather than
"statutory definition." Thus, the statutory definition of the charged
27. See, e.g., Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1886); Bums v. Municipal Court,
195 Cal. App. 2d 596, 599, 16 Cal. Rptr. 64, 67 (1961); cf. Ex parte Cohen, 6 Cal.
318, 321 (1856) (stating the same rule regarding civil cases). See generally 21 AM.
JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 390 (1965); 13 CAL. JUR. 2d Courts § 81 (1954).
28. In re Griffin, 67 Cal. 2d 343, 347, 431 P.2d 625, 628-29, 62 Cal. Rptr. 1,
4-5 (1967) (citations omitted). See generally B. WITKJN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE § 28 (1963) and §§ 28-28(A) (Supp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Wn'i=].
29. See text accompanying notes 133-42 infra.
30. "The jury, or judge if a jury trial is waived, may find the defendant guilty
of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which
he is charged ...... CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1159 (West 1970).
31. See generally Barnett, The Lesser-Included Offense Doctrine: A Present Day
Analysis for Practitioners, 5 CONN. L. REv. 255 (1972); McKissack, The Included Of-
fense Doctrine in California, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 870 (1963).
32. E.g., People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 596, 184 P.2d 512, 516 (1947); People
v. Krupa, 64 Cal. App. 2d 592, 598, 149 P.2d 416, 420 (1944).
33. People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 73, 450 P.2d 591, 595, 75 Cal. Rptr. 199,
203 (1969), quoting, People v. Kerrick, 144 Cal. 46, 47, 77 P. 711, 712 (1904); ac-
cord, People v. McGrath, 94 Cal. App. 520, 522, 271 P. 549, 550 (1928).
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offense is not the exclusive measure of included offenses if the plead-
ing is not drawn in the language of the statute; rather, a lesser offense
is necessarily included if it is within the specific language of the ac-
cusation itself.8 4 "[Tihe test as to whether a defendant's conviction
of a charge not specifically mentioned in the indictment or information
is valid depends on whether the accusatory pleadings gave him notice
of every possible theory under which the prosecution was proceed-
ing."'35  Once again, notice-and thus due process-appears as the
primary consideration.36
Jury instructions 37 related to lesser included offenses have natu-
rally been as troublesome as the doctrine itself. Present rules hold.
that where there is evidence which, if accepted by the trier of fact,
could absolve the accused from guilt of the greater offense but would
support a guilty verdict on the lesser, the court must so instruct sua
sponte,18 on the principle that, even when not requested, instructions
are mandatory on the general theories of law relevant to issues sup-
ported by the evidence.39 Where the evidence would not support a
finding of guilt on the lesser crime, or where the defendant is either
guilty of the offense charged or not guilty at all (as where he employs
34. E.g., People v. Cannady, 8 Cal. 3d 379, 390, 503 P.2d 585, 592, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 136 (1972); People v. Marshall, 48 Cal. 2d 394, 398-400, 309 P.2d 456,
458-62 (1957); People v. Chandler, 234 Cal. App. 2d 705, 708, 44 Cal. Rptr. 750,
752 (1965).
35. People v. Labrum, 25 Cal. App. 3d 105, 110, 101 Cal. Rptr. 602, 606 (1972)
(citation omitted).
36. Compare the treatment of included offenses in CAL. PEN. CODE § 1159 (West
1970), with the more detailed ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) ("A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense
charged in the indictment [or the information]. An offense is so included when: (a)
it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged; or (b) it consists of an attempt or solicitation
to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury
or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser kind of
culpability suffices to establish its commission.").
37. See generally CAL. PEN. CODE § 1127 (West 1970).
38. People v. Wilson, 66 Cal. 2d 749, 759, 427 P.2d 820, 827, 59 Cal. Rptr.
156, 163 (1967); People v. Crary, 265 Cal. App. 2d 534, 540, 71 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460-
61 (1968); People v. Morrison, 228 Cal. App. 2d 707, 712, 39 Cal. Rptr. 874, 877
(1964); cf. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 449-50, 462 P.2d 370, 372, 82 Cal. Rptr.
618, 620 (1969) (implying that wherever a lesser included offense exists, and it is sup-
ported by the evidence, the instruction is mandatory); People v. Landrum, 261 Cal.
App. 2d 372, 67 Cal. Rptr. 911 (1968) (error in failure to give instruction sua sponte
is reversible per se).
39. See, e.g., People v. St. Martin, 1 Cal. 3d 524, 531, 463 P.2d 390, 393, 83
Cal. Rptr. 166, 169 (1970); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 489-90, 386 P.2d
677, 681-82, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81-82 (1963); People v. Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d 768, 773,
228 P.2d 281, 284 (1951).
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only an alibi defense), of course the instruction need not be given.40
Erroneous requests for, or objections to, instructions have re-
ceived dual treatment by courts of appeal. When the defense coun-
sel's behavior is viewed as a matter of deliberate trial tactics, the doc-
trine of "invited error" is generally applied, 41 precluding the defendant
from raising the point at a later time.42 On the other hand, if "counsel
suggests or accedes to the erroneous instruction because of neglect
or mistake we do not find 'invited error' . . . . -4n Unfortunately,
the dubious distinction between measured tactics, and strategy based
on erroneous interpretations of confusing legal points often may render
such an analysis inapposite.
Guilty Pleas and the Statutes
A complete examination of the guilty plea process and plea bar-
gaining is unnecessary for the purposes of the present comment; the
field has been amply discussed of late in any event.44  It should be
40. People v. Morrison, 228 Cal. App. 2d 707, 713, 39 Cal. Rptr. 874, 878
(1964). Indeed, it is error to give the instruction in such situations. Id. at 713, 39
Cal. Rptr. at 878.
41. See, e.g., People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 318, 455 P.2d 153, 163, 78
Cal. Rptr. 217, 227 (1969); People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 580-81 n.4, 414 P.2d
353, 358-59 n.4, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 230-31 n.4 (1966); People v. Williams, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 34, 58, 99 Cal. Rptr. 103, 122 (1971) (dictum); cf. People v. Coogler, 71
Cal. 2d 153, 454 P.2d 686, 77 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1969), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971
(1972); People v. Nye, 63 Cal. 2d 166, 403 P.2d 736, 45 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1026 (1966); People v. Williams, 128 Cal. App. 2d 458, 275 P.2d
513 (1954).
42. But see People v. Keelin, 136 Cal. App. 2d 860, 289 P.2d 520 (1955).
"[B]oth the prosecution and the defense requested the court to give this instruction
and, therefore, it is apparent that the error, so far as the defense is concerned, is open
to the charge that it was invited error of which they cannot complain. Nevertheless,
error is nonetheless error and is no less operative on the deliberations of the jury be-
cause the erroneous instruction may have been requested by counsel for the defense.
After all, it is the life and liberty of the defendant in a case such as this that is at
hazard in the trial and there is a continuing duty upon the part of the trial court to
see to it that the jury are properly instructed upon all matters pertinent to their decision
of the cause. It is not every case in which invited error will free the trial from the
challenge that such error caused or contributed to a miscarriage of justice." Id. at
874-75, 289 P.2d at 529. See also CAL. CONsT. art. 6, § 13 (added 1966); CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1259 (West 1970).
43. People v. Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 319, 455 P.2d 153, 163, 78 Cal. Rptr.
217, 227 (1969); accord, People v. Williams, 22 Cal. App. 3d 34, 58, 99 Cal. Rptr.
103, 122 (1971); People v. Ruiz, 11 Cal. App. 3d 852, 865, 90 Cal. Rptr. 110, 118
(1970); People v. Helfend, 1 Cal. App. 3d 873, 882, 82 Cal. Rptr. 295, 301 (1969).
44. See generally D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966) [hereinafter cited as NEWMAN]; ABA PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF
GUILTY (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968); Bishop, Rights
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noted that the California Penal Code prescribes certain procedures for
the rendering and accepting of such pleas,4 5 and relatively recent ad-
ditions to the statute permit, in certain described circumstances, spec-
ification of degree and/or punishment when a plea is offered.
46
A valid guilty plea, accepted by the court, is a confession of every
element of the offense charged,4 7 and is the practical equivalent of
a conviction,48 eliminating the need for the prosecution to produce any
further evidence. 49  Further, it is a waiver of all nonjurisdictional de-
fects arising prior thereto, and of all defenses to the accusation, 0 al-
though the plea does not preclude appeal of irregularities concerning
constitutional rights not properly relinquished, 1 and subject matter
jurisdiction is, of course, not waived or conferred by a guilty plea.5"
A plea to an offense which, on the record, the defendant clearly did
not commit does not forego an appeal on that issue. 53
and Responsibilities of the Defendant Pleading Guilty, 49 J. URBAIN L. 1 (1971) (de-
tailed analysis of Michigan law, with some comparative study of other jurisdictions);
Gentile, Fair Bargains and Accurate Pleas, 49 B.U.L. Rav. 514 (1969); Newman &
Nemoyer, Issues of Propriety in Negotiated Justice, 47 DENVER L.J. 367 (1970); Com-
ment, Judicial Supervision Over California Plea Bargaining: Regulating the Trade, 59
CALIF. L. RAY. 962 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Supervision]; Comment, Judicial
Participation in Guilty Pleas-A Search for Standards, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 151
(1971).
45. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 859a, 1016-18 (West 1970).
46. Id. at §§ 1192.1-.2, 1192.5 (West Supp. 1973).
47. E.g., People v. Jones, 52 Cal. 2d 636, 651, 343 P.2d 577, 586 (1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 926 (1960); People v. Herrera, 255 Cal. App. 2d 469, 471, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 96, 97 (1967); People v. Horton, 174 Cal. App. 2d 740, 742, 345 P.2d 45, 46
(1959).
48. E.g., Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 869, 338 P.2d 182, 184 (1959);
People v. McDaniels, 165 Cal. App. 2d 283, 285, 331 P.2d 450, 451 (1958); see
People v. Jones, 52 Cal. 2d 636, 651, 343 P.2d 577, 586 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
926 (1960).
49. E.g., People v. McDaniels, 165 Cal. App. 2d 283, 285, 331 P.2d 450, 451
(1958); People v. Brown, 140 Cal. App. 616, 619, 36 P.2d 194, 195 (1934); see People
v. Jones, 52 Cal. 2d 636, 651, 343 P.2d 577, 586 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 926
(1960).
50. E.g., People v. Laudermilk, 67 Cal. 2d 272, 281-282, 431 P.2d 228, 235, 61
Cal. Rptr. 644, 651 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 861 (1968); Stephens v. Toomey,
51 Cal. 2d 864, 870, 338 P.2d 182, 185 (1959); People v. Williams, 177 Cal. App.
2d 581, 582, 2 Cal. Rptr. 387, 387-88 (1960).
51. People v. Navarro, 243 Cal. App. 2d 755, 758-61, 52 Cal. Rptr. 686, 688-
89 (1966); see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122,
460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911 (1970) (rules re-
garding waiver of certain constitutional rights in guilty plea situations). See generally
Bishop, Rights and Responsibilities of the Defendant Pleading Guilty, 49 J. URBAN L.
1 (1971); Note, Guilty Pleas and the Concept of Waiver, 5 WmLAmErr- L.J. 575
(1969).
52. See note 134 and accompanying text infra.
53. See, e.g., In re Madrid, 19 Cal. App. 3d 996, 97 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1971); In
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"Informal Amendments"
Where under certain conduct of the defendant or circum-
stances created by him he is deemed to have impliedly consented
that the information be treated as though the crime of which he
has been convicted had been pleaded, the conviction where sup-
ported by the evidence will be upheld. 54
The concept of "informal amendment of the pleadings" is a rela-
tively recent development in California law, first expressed in People
v. Hensel in 1965." A revealing aspect of the lack of general knowl-
edge or understanding of the principle is that, in each of the cases
in which it has appeared on appeal,5" the trial court had erroneously
deemed the offense of which defendant was convicted "necessarily in-
cluded" in the crime charged. The appellate tribunal in every in-
stance noted the error,5 7 yet upheld the conviction by way of finding
an express or implied informal amendment of the pleadings in the
trial court to include the offense of which defendant stood convicted.
The essential rationale of each of the cases rests upon a similar
basis; indeed, they cite one another, and all draw their vitality from
the first:
Here, as in [Hensel], a defendant, represented by competent
counsel, stood by and acquiesced in a procedure whereby he was
forever discharged on the serious counts included in the informa-
tion as originally filed, and convicted of a less serious offense.
Had defendant felt that he was in any way prejudiced by the ac-
tion of the trial court, he could have prevented the error now re-
lied on by a simple objection. As in Hensel, defendant's failure
to object must be regarded as an implied consent to treat the infor-
mation as having been amended to include the offense on which
the sentence was imposed, and thus to be a waiver of the only
objection-lack of notice of the offense charged-which was avail-
able to defendant. 58
The variety of circumstances under which such an amendment has
been found merits examination.
re Scruggs, 15 Cal. App. 3d 290, 93 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1971). Such a plea, encouraged
by the defendant's attorney, may indicate that the defendant has been denied effective
right to counsel. See In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 460 P.2d 984, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784
(1969).
54. People v. Rasher, 3 Cal. App. 3d 798, 805, 83 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729 (1970).
55. 233 Cal. App. 2d 834, 43 Cal. Rptr. 865, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 942 (1965).
56. See text accompanying notes 59-78 infra.
57. In three instances, the court of appeals raised this issue on its own motion.
People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 450 P.2d 591, 75 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1969); People
v. Taylor, 273 Cal. App. 2d 477, 78 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1969); People v. Mayes, 262 Cal.
App. 2d 195, 68 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1968).
58. People v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 888, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420 (1965);
accord, People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 75, 450 P.2d 591, 596-597, 75 Cal. Rptr.






Hensel59 itself involved submission of the case to the court on
the transcript of the preliminary examination.6" The defendant was
found guilty as charged, and his motion for a new trial was denied.
However, at the urging of defense counsel, the court set aside the
order denying the new trial, and entertained another such motion.
Defendant's attorney engaged in "a running discussion' with the court,
"designed to arrive at a just determination of a particular case on
its own particular facts." 61  The appellate tribunal, noting that the in-
formation could have been amended with defendant's consent to add
an additional count, and that he had "knowingly allowed the case to
proceed to judgment," declared that the effect of the trial court pro-
ceedings was an "informal amendment of the information to include
a charge which was supported by the evidence although not by the
original information. . . ." Insofar as he had been acquitted of the
original charge by this process, the defendant could not challenge it
on appeal.
0 2
Two other transcript submission actions, both involving narcotics
offenses, similarly concerned reductions to unincluded lesser crimes
following conviction. 63 In each of these, however, the unincluded of-
fense had been charged in the original multi-count information, but
the court had found the defendant guilty only of the other, greater
charge. Upon a motion for new trial by the defendant, the court found
him guilty of the lesser offense instead; in one instance upon his re-
quest,64 and in the other, on the theory that the lesser charge remained
pending at the time of the motion for new trial.65
59. 233 Cal. App. 2d 834, 43 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1965) (information charged Penal
Code section 288a, oral copulation; convicted of Penal Code section 647(a), soliciting
or engaging in lewd or dissolute conduct in a public place).
60. See generally People v. Valdez, 82 Cal. App. 2d 744, 187 P.2d 74 (1947)
(holding that the process of submission of a cause to the court on the transcript of
the preliminary examination is constitutionally sound).
61. 233 Cal. App. 2d at 839, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
62. Id. at 839-40, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
63. People v. Cressey, 2 Cal. 3d 836, 471 P.2d 19, 87 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1970)
(information charged Health and Safety Code sections 11530, 11556, possession of
marijuana and knowing presence in a place where marijuana is being used; convicted
of section 11556); People v. Blunt, 241 Cal. App. 2d 200, 50 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1966)
(information charged Health and Safety Code sections 11530, 11531, possession of
marijuana and offering to sell, furnish or give away marijuana; convicted of section
11530).
64. People v. Blunt, 241 Cal. App. 2d 200, 205, 50 Cal. Rptr. 440, 444 (1966).
65. People v. Cressey, 2 Cal. 3d 836, 849 n.16, 471 P.2d 19, 28 n.16, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 699, 708 n.16 (1970). As this was actually the basis of the decision, Cressey
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In two additional instances of transcript submissions of narcotics
violations,66 the defense-apparently without objection from the prose-
cution 6'-stipulated that a lesser offense would be considered neces-
sarily included in the crime charged. On appeal, it was recognized
that the lesser offense was not actually included, but it was noted in
both cases that the defendant had, for practical purposes, as much as
requested his conviction on the stipulated offense.6
Three cases involving submission on the preliminary transcript, 9
however, resulted in erroneous findings of necessarily included offenses
despite the lack of any affirmative request by the defendant, at least
on the record of the action. In each instance, no evidence was of-
fered, nor argument presented, on behalf of the defendant, nor any
objection raised to the verdict. Bargains of some sort had apparently
taken place, though; the appellate courts remarked that, in submitting
the case as it had, the defendant could not "rationally have anticipated
anything other than a finding of guilty of some offense." Accordingly,
either he had "intended to throw himself completely upon the mercy
of the court," or, the appellate tribunal commented, he had arranged
in advance to be convicted of the lesser offense.7"
will not be further discussed, although it possesses several characteristics of the "infor-
mal amendment" situations.
66. People v. Roeschlaub, 21 Cal. App. 3d 874, 98 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1971) (in-
formation charged Health and Safety Code section 11912, offering to sell a restricted
dangerous drug; convicted of Health and Safety Code section 11557, maintaining a
place for selling a narcotic drug); People v. Calder, 6 Cal. App. 3d 931, 86 Cal. Rptr.
446 (1970) (information charged Health and Safety Code section 11530, possession
of marijuana; convicted of Health and Safety Code section 11556, knowing presence
in a place where marijuana is being used).
67. In Roeschlaub, however, the prosecution refused to concur in the stipulation.
See note 145 and accompanying text infra.
68. People v. Roeschlaub, 21 Cal. App. 3d 874, 879, 98 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891
(1971); People v. Calder, 6 Cal. App. 3d 931, 936, 86 Cal. Rptr. 446, 448-49 (1970).
69. People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 450 P.2d 591, 75 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1969)
(information charged Health and Safety Code section 11531, offering to sell, furnish
or give away marijuana: convicted of Health and Safety Code section 11530, possession
of marijuana); People v. Dorsey, 25 Cal. App. 3d 366, 101 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1972)
(information charged Penal Code sections 487(3), 664, attempted grand theft; con-
victed of Vehicle Code section 10852, breaking or removing vehicle parts without the
owner's consent); People v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965)
(information charged Penal Code section 487, grand theft; convicted of Penal Code
section 499b, taking an automobile without the owner's consent for the purpose of tem-
porarily using or operating).
70. People v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 887, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417, 419 (1965);
accord, People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 74, 450 P.2d 591, 596, 75 CaL Rptr. 199,
204 (1969); People v. Dorsey, 25 Cal. App. 3d 366, 368, 101 Cal. Rptr. 826, 827-
28 (1972). The court in Dorsey stated that, "It is understandable that neither [the
defendant] nor his lawyer thereafter made any objection in the trial court to the court's
finding." 25 Cal. App. 3d at 368, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 828, quoting, People v. Francis,
71 Cal. 2d 66, 74-75, 450 P.2d 591, 596, 75 Cal. Rptr. 199, 204.
[Vol. 251084
One final case, 1 arising in juvenile court, falls into this line of
decisions. Although no express request was made for reduction to
a lesser unincluded charge, defense counsel engaged in discussions
with the court relating thereto. The appellate court, analogizing to
the Hensel line of cases and noting the defendant's failure to object
to the procedure, found that the disposition had been "in the nature
of an amended petition."
72
Erroneous Instructions: Invited Error
Relying on the invited error principle,1 3 courts of appeal sustained
four jury verdicts of offenses not necessarily included, 74 because de-
fense counsel had requested that an instruction be given on the lesser
crime. Although only two of the cases specifically apply the informal
amendment process1 5 all four discuss the Hensel doctrine, and pro-
ceed on the theory that, since the due process requirement of notice
to the defendant has been met, application of the informal amendment
principle is "no more than an effort to put the procedural steps at
the trial level in order ....
Similarly, in another case77 the defense counsel, at the conclusion
71. In re Stanley B., 17 Cal. App. 3d 530, 95 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1971) (informa-
tion charged Penal Code sections 217 (two counts, assault with intent to commit mur-
der), 245 (assault with a deadly weapon), 496 (concealing a stolen weapon); convicted
of Penal Code section 417 (drawing, exhibiting or using a firearm)).
72. Id. at 534-535, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
73. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
74. People v. Ramos, 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 101 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1972) (informa-
tion charged Penal Code section 217, assault with intent to commit murder; convicted
of Penal Code section 245, assault with a deadly weapon); People v. Chavira, 3 Cal.
App. 3d 988, 83 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1970) (information charged Penal Code sections 217,
(two counts, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill), 246 (maliciously dis-
charging a firearm in a building); convicted of Penal Code section 417, (displaying a
firearm in a rude and boisterous manner)); People v. Wright, 272 Cal. App. 2d 53,
76 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1969) (information charged Penal Code sections 459 (burglary),
243 (battery); convicted of Penal Code sections 602 (misdemeanor trespass), 243 (bat-
tery)); People v. Mayes, 262 Cal. App. 2d 195, 68 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1968) (information
charged Penal Code section 187, (murder); convicted of Penal Code section 242, (bat-
tery)). Contra, People v. Arnett, 126 Cal. 680, 681, 59 P. 204 (1899) (overruled on
other points in People v. Tong, 155 Cal. 579, 102 P. 263 (1909) and People v. Mc-
Curdy, 165 Cal. App. 2d 592, 332 P.2d 350 (1958)). See also People v. Powell, 236
Cal. App. 2d 884, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965). "Where the trial is by jury there is
no practicable way of amending the information after the jury has made known its
decision to find the defendant guilty of the lesser but nonincluded offense." Id. at
888, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 420 (dictum).
75. People v. Ramos, 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 539, 101 Cal. Rptr. 230, 236 (1970);
People v. Chavira, 3 Cal. App. 3d 988, 992, 83 Cal. Rptr. 851, 854 (1970).
76. People v. Ramos, 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 539, 101 Cal. Rptr. 230, 236 (1970).
77. People v. Taylor, 273 Cal. App. 2d 477, 78 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1969) (informa-
tion charged Penal Code sections 21 la (four counts, armed robbery), 189 (attempted
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of the evidence in a non-jury trial, requested that the defendant be
convicted of a lesser charge; on appeal, the court had no difficulty
in finding that under the circumstances the accused had impliedly con-
sented that the information be treated as though the lesser crime had
been pleaded.
Perhaps the most controversial application of the informal amend-
ment concept appears in People v. Rasher.78  In a jury trial, prior
to the taking of evidence the defense attorney submitted to the court
proposed instructions containing an erroneous "necessarily included
lesser offense." At trial, the defense of diminished capacity was
raised by certain psychiatric testimony, and at the close of the evi-
dence, counsel for the defense, intending to submit the matter solely
on the crime charged, moved to withdraw the "lesser included" in-
struction. This motion was denied by the court, the instruction was
given sua sponte, and defendant was convicted thereon. On appeal,
a divided court held that the effect of the proceedings was to accom-
plish an informal amendment: 79 by introducing the lesser offense as
an issue (thus giving notice to the prosecution that he intended to
rely on the "necessarily included" theory at trial) and by actually al-
lowing the case to be tried on this matter, the defense had treated
the lesser crime as having been pleaded, in spite of the objections
raised at the conclusion of the evidence.
Theoretical Foundations
The vigorous dissent in Rasher,80 which contains a brief catalogue
of the informal amendment decisions to that time, rather summarily
analyzes the doctrine by noting a supposed "common element" in those
earlier actions: "the acquiescence of the defendant in the procedure
by which he was convicted of the lesser crime at the time the case
was submitted for decision.""' Although this is not strictly accurate,
in nine of the prosecutions the defense requested conviction on the
lesser offense,82 in four others the appellate court found that the de-
murder), 245b (assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer); convicted of Penal
Code sections 211a (four counts, first degree robbery), 245a (assault with a deadly
weapon), 240 (simple assault)).
78. 3 Cal. App. 3d 798, 83 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1970) (2-1 decision) (information
charged Penal Code section 245, assault with a deadly weapon; convicted of Penal
Code section 417, drawing or exhibiting a weapon in a rude, threatening or angry man-
ner).
79. Id. at 803, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
80. Id. at 805, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 807, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
82. People v. Ramos, 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 538, 101 Cal. Rptr. 230, 235 (1972);
People v. Roeschlaub, 21 Cal. App. 3d 874, 879, 98 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (1971); People
v. Calder, 6 Cal. App. 3d 931, 933-34, 86 Cal. Rptr. 446, 448 (1970); People v. Cha-
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fendant had clearly consented to the result, 83 and only in Rasher did
the accused actually object prior to a finding of guilty on the lesser
charge.
8 4
It is noteworthy in this regard that the progenitor of the concept,
Hensel, distinguished on this particular basis a similar case s5 that had
overturned the conviction, and stated that the record of the earlier
action contained nothing to indicate that the defendant had requested
or acquiesced in the verdict.88 The most recent in the Hensel line
of cases expressly restates the same ground as a basis for its holding,
and asserts that appellate tribunals have "long held" that when the
accused acquiesces in his conviction on any lesser offense, even an
unincluded one, "he cannot later be heard to complain." 87
Hensel, however, did not expressly indicate why consent or re-
quest by a defendant to a conviction of a non-necessarily included les-
ser crime was fundamental to, and resulted in, informal amendment
of the pleadings. The same appellate court shortly produced the an-
swer in two succeeding cases: the defendant's -failure to object to his
conviction of the unincluded offense was a waiver of the only objec-
tions available, denial of due process by lack of notice8  or conviction
of a crime which he was not proved to have committed.8 9
In this context, it must be noted that People v. Marshall, ° the
California Supreme Court case that expanded the definition of "neces-
sarily included lesser" to encompass the language of the accusatory
vira, 3 Cal. App. 3d 988, 991, 83 Cal. Rptr. 851, 853 (1970); People v. Taylor, 273
Cal. App. 2d 477, 485, 78 Cal. Rptr. 51, 55 (1969); People v. Wright, 272 Cal. App.
2d 53, 58, 76 CaL Rptr. 859, 863 (1969); People v. Mayes, 262 Cal. App. 2d 195,
201, 68 Cal. Rptr. 476, 481 (1968); People v. Blunt, 241 Cal. App. 2d 200, 205, 50
Cal. Rptr. 440, 444 (1966); People v. Hensel, 233 Cal. App. 2d 834, 839, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 865, 869 (1965).
83. People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 74-75, 450 P.2d 591, 596, 75 Cal. Rptr.
199, 204 (1969); People v. Dorsey, 25 Cal. 3d 366, 368, 101 Cal. Rptr. 826,
827-828 (1972); In re Stanley B., 17 Cal. App. 3d 530, 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. 116, 120
(1971); People v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 887-88, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420
(1965).
84. 3 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
85. People v. Leech, 232 Cal. App. 2d 397, 42 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1965).
86. 233 Cal. App. 2d at 839, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
87. People v. Ramos, 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 539, 101 Cal. Rptr. 230, 236 (1972);
accord, People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 612, 477 P.2d 409, 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385,
396 (1970).
88. People v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 888, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420 (1965),
quoted in, People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 75, 450 P.2d 591, 596-97, 75 Cal. Rptr.
199, 204-05 (1969), and, People v. Calder, 6 Cal. App. 3d 931, 936, 86 Cal. Rptr.
446, 449 (1970).
89. People v. Blunt, 241 Cal. App. 2d 200, 204, 50 Cal. Rptr. 440, 443 (1966);
cf. People v. Chavira, 3 Cal. App. 3d 988, 991-92, 83 Cal. Rptr. 851, 854 (1970).
90. 48 Cal. 2d 394, 309 P.2d 456 (1957).
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pleading, did so on the basis of the notice provided to the defendant
thereby, and the resultant fairness of such a process in allowing an
accused to prepare a defense.91  In re Hess,92 often cited for the prin-
ciple that a person cannot be convicted of an uncharged, unincluded
offense, similarly rested on the proposition that "[d]ue process of law
requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him in order
that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his
defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his
trial."93  Two of the early informal amendment cases stated that the
"real test" of the validity of a conviction was "whether the defendant
had knowledge of every possible theory under which the prosecution
was proceeding or whether he was taken by surprise." '94 Perhaps the
clearest statement of the theory appears in People v. Ramos;95 citing
the Hess decision and People v. West, 6 the court unequivocally as-
serted that the traditional rule was obviously grounded in due process
and notice principles 7 and, quoting West, declared that, "a defendant
who requests or acquiesces in conviction of a lesser offense cannot
"198legitimately claim lack of notice ....
However, as noted above, 99 at least one other factor is essential
to the process of informal amendment, without which a conviction will
apparently not stand: the evidence must support the verdict. 10
Eleven of the cases under consideration specifically state that the evi-
dence was sufficient to sustain a finding of guilty on the lesser of-
fense;.. indeed, four of these asserted that the evidence would have
91. In this context, it has been asserted that the "informal amendment" cases
actually represent an extension of the Marshall test of necessarily included offenses.
See People v. Asher, 273 Cal. App. 2d 876, 906, 78 Cal. Rptr. 885, 903 (1969); Wrr-
KIN, supra note 28, § 543, at 474 (Supp. 1973).
92. 45 Cal. 2d 171, 288 P.2d 5 (1955).
93. Id. at 175, 288 P.2d at 7, quoted in People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 612,
477 P.2d 409, 419, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 395 (1970), and People v. Feldman, 171 Cal.
App. 2d 15, 23, 339 P.2d 888, 894 (1959).
94. People v. Mayes, 262 Cal. App. 2d 195, 199, 68 Cal. Rptr. 476, 480 (1968),
quoted in People v. Wright, 272 Cal. App. 2d 53, 58, 76 Cal. Rptr. 859, 862 (1969).
95. 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 101 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1972).
96. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
97. "Regardless of the fact that the evidence amply justified the finding, the lack
of notice in the charge makes the finding impermissible, absent a most radical reinter-
pretation of the due process clause." People v. Henderson, 26 Cal. App. 3d 232, 238,
102 Cal. Rptr. 670, 674 (1972) (citation omitted).
98. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 539, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
99. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
100. Cf. People v. Traylor, 23 Cal. App. 3d 323, 334-35, 100 Cal. Rptr. 116, 123
(1972); People v. Wilson, 271 Cal. App. 2d 60, 63, 76 Cal. Rptr. 195, 197 (1969).
See also Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 204 (1960).
101. People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 74, 450 P.2d 591, 596, 75 Cal. Rptr. 199,
204 (1969); People v. Ramos, 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 538, 101 Cal. Rptr. 230, 235
(1972); People v. Dorsey, 25 Cal. App. 3d 366, 368, 101 Cal. Rptr. 826, 827 (1972);
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supported conviction of the charged greater crimes, as well.' Appar-
ently, the courts think that Penal Code provisions regarding new trials
for verdicts contrary to the evidence 0" encompass informally amended
pleadings as well as their formal counterparts.
Additional considerations were commented upon in several of the
informal amendment decisions. In all of the cases, defendant was ap-
parently represented by an attorney, and in five of the prosecutions
the appellate court remarked upon the presence of "competent coun-
sel." 1' 04 On four occasions, it was noted on appeal that the accusatory
pleading could have been formally amended prior to conviction; 0 5 in
fact, this opportunity existed in all of the cases, as, had the amendment
been technically improper, the defendant's consent-and consequent
lack of objection-would have resulted in a waiver of such defects. 0 6
People v. Roeschlaub, 21 Cal. App. 3d 874, 878, 98 Cal. Rptr. 888, 890 (1971); In
re Stanley B., 17 Cal. App. 3d 530, 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. 116, 120 (1971); People v.
Chavira, 3 Cal. App. 3d 988, 992, 83 Cal. Rptr. 851, 854 (1970); People v. Rasher,
3 Cal. App. 3d 798, 802-03, 83 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1970); People v. Mayes, 262
Cal. App. 2d 195, 201, 68 Cal Rptr. 476, 480 (1968); People v. Blunt, 241 Cal. App.
2d 200, 204, 50 Cal. Rptr. 440, 443 (1966); People v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884,
887, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417, 419 (1965); People v. Hensel, 233 Cal. App. 2d 834, 840,
43 Cal. Rptr. 865, 869 (1965). Three other cases are silent on this subject. People
v. Calder, 6 Cal. App. 3d 931, 86 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1970); People v. Taylor, 273 Cal.
App. 2d 477, 78 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1969); People v. Wright, 272 Cal. App. 2d 53, 76
Cal. Rptr. 859 (1969). Cf. People v. Cressey, 2 Cal. 3d 836, 849 n.16, 471 P.2d
19, 28 n.16, 87 Cal. Rptr. 699, 708 n.16 (1970) (distinguishing People v. Wilson, 271
Cal. App. 2d 60, 76 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1969) on this ground).
102. People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 74, 450 P.2d 591, 596, 75 Cal. Rptr. 199,
204 (1969); People v. Dorsey, 25 Cal. App. 3d 366, 368, 101 Cal. Rptr. 826, 828
(1972); People v. Roeschlaub, 21 Cal. App. 3d 874, 878, 98 Cal. Rptr. 888, 890
(1971); People v. Blunt, 241 Cal. App. 2d 200, 204, 50 Cal. Rptr. 440, 443 (1966);
see In re Stanley B., 17 Cal. App. 3d 530, 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. 116, 120 (1971); People
v. Chavira, 3 Cal. App. 3d 988, 991, 83 Cal. Rptr. 851, 853 (1970); People v. Rasher,
3 Cal. App. 3d 798, 802-03, 83 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1970); People v. Hensel, 233
Cal. App. 2d 834, 837, 43 Cal. Rptr. 865, 868 (1965). Three cases do not mention
the sufficiency of the evidence vis-a-vis the original charges. People v. Cressey, 2 Cal.
3d 836, 471 P.2d 19 (1972); People v. Ramos, 25 Cal. App. 3d 529, 101 Cal. Rptr.
230 (1972); People v. Mayes, 262 Cal. App. 2d 195, 68 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1968).
103. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181(6) (West 1970).
104. People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 75, 450 P.2d 591, 596, 75 Cal. Rptr. 199,
204 (1969), quoting People v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 888, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417,
420 (1965); In re Stanley B., 17 Cal. App. 3d 530, 535, 95 Cal. Rptr. 116, 119 (1971);
People v. Rasher, 3 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803, 83 Cal. Rptr. 724, 728 (1970). See cases
cited in note 53 supra regarding denial of effective right to counsel in guilty plea situa-
tions.
105. People v. Chavira, 3 Cal. App. 3d 988, 992, 83 Cal. Rptr. 851, 854 (1970);
People v. Rasher, 3 Cal. App. 3d 798, 804, 83 Cal. Rptr. 724, 728 (1970); People
v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 887-88, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420 (1965) (distinguish-
ing People v. Leech, 232 Cal. App. 2d 397, 42 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1965) on this ground);
People v. Hensel, 233 Cal. App. 2d 834, 839, 43 Cal. Rptr. 865, 869 (1965).
106. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
March 19741 UNINCLUDED LESSER OFF::ENSE_.S
Finally, the lack of prejudice' 07-- or, perhaps, the apparent or ac-
tual benefit' 1° 8-to the defendant in being convicted of the lesser of-
fense and receiving dismissal of the more serious charges was noted
in several cases. The "leniency"'1 9 shown by the judge or jury in
delivering the "most favorable" 110 finding possible was advanced in
support of the proposition that the "lucky""' defendant was in no posi-
tion to attack the judgment of the lower court, as whatever error oc-
curred was in his favor.
Informal Amendment Theory: The Problems
For many years, in circumstances quite similar to some of the
Hensel line of cases, courts invariably refused to sustain convictions of
unincluded offenses, and relied on the Hess rationale that such a judg-
ment could not stand regardless of the evidence." 2
The basis of this theory is the due process requirement of no-
tice." 3  As discussed above, the informal amendment cases have dis-
posed of the defendants' contentions in this area by holding that in
view of the "request or acquiescence," the accused did indeed have
notice of the charges, and cannot complain on that score." 4
A substantial difficulty, however, is raised by the Rasher" 5 hold-
107. People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 74-75, 450 P.2d 591, 596-97, 75 Cal. Rptr.
199, 204-05 (1969); In re Stanley B., 17 Cal. App. 3d 530, 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. 116,
120 (1971); People v. Calder, 6 Cal. App. 3d 931, 936, 86 Cal. Rptr. 446, 449 (1970);
People v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 887, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420 (1965).
108. People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 75, 450 P.2d 591, 596-97, 75 Cal. Rptr.
199, 204-05 (1969); People v. Dorsey, 25 Cal. App. 3d 366, 368, 101 CaL Rptr. 826,
827-28 (1972) People v. Roeschlaub, 21 Cal. App. 3d 874, 880, 98 Cal. Rptr. 890,
892 (1971); In re Stanley B., 17 Cal. App. 3d 530, 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. 116, 120 (1971);
People v. Rasher, 3 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803, 83 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1970); People
v. Mayes, 262 Cal. App. 2d 195, 201, 68 Cal. Rptr. 476, 481 (1968); People v. Blunt,
241 Cal. App. 2d 200, 204, 50 Cal. Rptr. 440, 444 (1966); People v. Powell, 236 Cal.
App. 2d 884, 887-88, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420 (1965).
109. See In re Stanley B., 17 Cal. App. 3d 530, 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. 116, 120
(1971); People v. Rasher, 3 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803, 83 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1970);
People v. Blunt, 241 Cal. App. 2d 200, 204, 50 Cal. Rptr. 440, 444 (1966).
110. People v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 887, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420 (1965).
111. In re Stanley B., 17 Cal. App. 3d 530, 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. 116, 120 (1971).
112. E.g., People v. Warren, 223 Cal. App. 2d 798, 36 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1963);
People v. Harris, 191 Cal. App. 2d 754, 12 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1961); People v. Travis,
171 Cal. App. 2d 842, 341 P.2d 851 (1959); People v. Kennedy, 133 Cal. App. 2d
693, 284 P.2d 898 (1955).
113. See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 88-98 supra. The apparent suggestion in People
v. Collins, 54 Cal. 2d 57, 351 P.2d 326, 4 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1960), that the evidence
at the preliminary examination may be used to supply the requisite notice was essen-
tially refuted in People v. Leech, 232 Cal. App. 2d 397, 399, 42 cal. Rptr. 745, 747
(1965).
115. People v. Rasher, 3 CaL App. 3d 798, 83 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1970).
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ing: what behavior by the defendant is sufficient to support an
informal amendment? In that case, two justices on the court of appeal
strongly felt that the accused, by causing the action to be tried on
the lesser offense, had acquiesced in his conviction in spite of his at-
tempt to withdraw the proposed instruction, and thereby impliedly con-
sented that the pleadings be treated as amended. 16 The dissenting
judge, however, noting the confusion at the trial from perplexity over
the elements of, and defenses to, the crime charged, concluded that
the instruction on the unincluded offense resulted from "an erroneous
conception of the trial judge on the law."
117
Two distinct problems are presented by the reasoning in Rasher.
Need the defendant consent to the submission of the lesser crime to
the trier of fact at the conclusion of the trial? Further, is mere ac-
quiescence by the defendant a sufficient basis upon which to convict
him of an unincluded offense?
Quite clearly, some of the rationale for "informal amendment"
disappears when the defendant objects as in Rasher. Although notice
may be fulfilled," 8 no longer is it always true that the accusation could
have been formally amended anyway." 9  Further the benefit (or lack
of prejudice) is not so apparent when the defense has obviously
chosen against submission of the lesser, 120 presumably indicating a be-
lief that acquittal is likely (or at least possible) on the offense charged.
In view of the theory behind reliance on request or consent in the
other informal amendment decisions12 however-proof of notice to
the defendant, and consequent fulfillment of due process require-
ments-the Rasher dissent appears to be out of line.
A more serious difficulty, hinted at by Rasher, is presented by
the three cases in which the defendant's "consent" was found in noth-
ing more tha~A a failure to object when convicted of what the trial court
termed a "necessarily included offense."'12-  The confusing state of
the necessarily included doctrine has been mentioned; 23 in each of
these three decisions, as well as the others in the Hensel line, thq
trial court itself erroneously deemed the lesser crime "included."' 12
116. Id. at 803, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
117. Id. at 808, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
118. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
119. See text accompanying note 106 supra and notes 18-19 and accompanying
text supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 107-11 supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 82-98 supra.
122. People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 450 P.2d 591, 75 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1969);
People v. Dorsey, 25 Cal. App. 3d 366, 101 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1972); People v. Powell,
236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965).
123. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
124. See notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra.
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Where, as in these three instances, the court, rather than defense
counsel, introduces the lesser offense, it is unreasonable to expect the
defendant or his counsel to raise an objection on this ground; and pre-
sumably, if the evidence supports the verdict, there is no reason to
expect them to complain on any other basis. Although it is entirely
possible that in such cases the only notice supplied the defendant will
come from the verdict itself, at the time of conviction the defense can-
not object on this ground unless it knows the offense is not necessarily
included. 12  The "benefit" thus provided an unwary defendant is a
poor substitute for due process.
However, as noted earlier, 126 all three of these cases appear to
have involved plea bargain-type situations, of which the appellate
courts took note; in this context, the results are certainly more compre-
hensible. Hopefully, the decisions in California recognizing bargains,
and providing for their candid presentation to the court,127 and those
acknowledging that transcript submissions are often "tantamount to a
plea of guilty,"' 1 8 will remove the necessity for trial courts to speak in
veiled terms in such circumstances.
20
The strongest rationale for informal amendment is presented by
those instances where the defense actually requested or stipulated to
the conviction on the lesser offense, 3 ' thereby removing notice as a
factor and clearly supporting the argument that the pleadings might
have been formally amended in any event.13 ' If the three "mere ac-
125. A similar problem would arise if, in a jury trial, the prosecution requested
an instruction on an unincluded offense. The question presented in each instance
would appear to be whether, under the circumstances, the defense's failure to object
is a matter of deliberate trial tactics or a mere concurrence in the mistaken belief at
the judge or prosecuting attorney. See notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
126. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
127. E.g., People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970);
People v. Ramos, 26 Cal. App. 3d 108, 102 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1972). See also Jones
v. United States, 423 F.2d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 1970). Compare A.uz. R. Caim. P.
17.4 (terms of agreement reduced to writing, submitted to court, and entered in record
if plea accepted), with OHIO R. CiM. P. 11(f) (underlying agreement of negotiated
pleas in felony cases to be stated in an open court on record), and PA. R. CiuM. P.
319(b) (2) (1973) (similar to Ohio rule)-
128. In re Mosley, 1 Cal. 3d 913, 925, 464 P.2d 473, 479, 83 Cal. Rptr. 809,
815 (1970).
129. Compare People v. Powell, 236 Cal. App. 2d 884, 887, 46 Cal. Rptr. 417,
420 (1965) ("For defendant and his counsel to accept the court's leniency, and then
to appeal and demand a reversal upon the ground that the court convicted him of the
less serious offense, is not a practice which the law ought to encourage or reward."),
with People v. Titus, 85 Cal. App. 413, 416, 259 P. 465, 467 (1927) ("And although
it ill becomes the defendant to initiate the void proceeding, nevertheless we are under
the compulsion of declaring that there was no valid judgment of conviction of the first
offense.").
130. See cases cited in note 82 supra.
131. See text accompanying notes 105-06 supra.
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quiescence" cases are viewed as bargains, the entire Hensel line would
require that the defendant directly or indirectly request the lesser ver-
dict, and this appears to be the better standard.
Excess of Jurisdiction
Significantly, several of the cases -that refused to uphold convic-
tions of unincluded offenses asserted that the defect was jurisdic-
tional;'32 as mentioned above, it has been held that an accusatory
pleading is an unwaivable step in asserting subject matter jursidic-
tion, 133 and the question arises whether the lack of a formal accusation
on the unincluded offense is thus a fatal omission, uncured by any
request or consent by the defendant.
Clearly, if the error is a violation of subject matter jurisdiction,
the conviction on the lesser unincluded offense must fall, as such ju-
risdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel. 34  In
recent years, a theory of "excess of jurisdiction" has appeared 35 with
reference to courts acting contrary to procedures prescribed by stat-
ute.136 Unfortunately, this broad use of "jurisdiction" to mean "au-
thority to act only in a particular manner" has not been adequately
distinguished from "jurisdiction" in the fundamental sense over subject
matter and parties. At least two cases have observed that, in convict-
ing a defendant of an offense neither charged nor necessarily included,
a court is acting in excess of its jurisdiction. 37  "Apart from the consti-
tutional reasons why that must be so, there is simply no statutory au-
thority for what the trial court did."'38
132. People v. Granice, 50 Cal. 447 (1875). See note 112 and accompanying
text supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
134. E.g., Summers v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 295, 298, 347 P.2d 668, 670,
1 Cal. Rptr. 324, 326 (1959); In re Johannes, 213 Cal. 125, 129-30, 1 P.2d 984, 986
(1931) (or by stipulation of the parties).
135. See note 28 and accompanying text supra. "Even though a court has jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter and the person of the defendant, it still must act within
its jurisdiction, i.e., within the constitutional and statutory limitations. Acts in substan-
tial disregard of important limitations, or which deny fundamental rights or defenses,
are in excess of jurisdiction." WrIKN, supra note 28, § 28, at 32. See generally 1
B. Wrranr, CALroRN PROcEDmuRE, Jurisdiction §§ 179-229, at 706-66 (2d ed. 1970).
136. See Rodman v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 2d 262, 269, 89 P.2d 109, 112
(1939).
137. lit re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171, 175, 288 P.2d 5, 7 (1955); People v. Wilson,
271 Cal. App. 2d 60, 62, 76 Cal. Rptr. 195, 196 (1969). Other cases reach a similar
result without the "excess of jurisdiction" language; e.g., People v. Schumacher, 194
Cal. App. 2d 335, 340, 14 Cal. Rptr. 924, 927 (1961); People v. Harris, 191 Cal.
App. 2d 754, 759, 12 Cal. Rptr. 916, 920 (1961).
138. People v. Wilson, 271 Cal. App. 2d 60, 62, 76 Cal. Rptr. 195, 196 (1969)
(citation omitted).
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However, there is an important distinction to be drawn between
a court acting without subject matter jurisdiction, and a court over-
stepping the bounds of its jurisdiction in a particular case. While the
former goes to the fundamental authority of the court to try actions
of a particular type or class,13 9 and can thereby be raised at any stage
of the proceedings, 140 the latter is primarily a matter of procedural
due process and the essential fairness of the proceedings in view of
the error. In 1967, the California Supreme Court elucidated this cru-
cial difference in what amounted to due process terms:
When, as here, the court has jurisdiction of the subject, a
party who seeks or consents to action beyond the court's power
as defined by statute or decisional rule may be estopped to com-
plain of the ensuing action in excess of jurisdiction. Whether he
shall be estopped depends on the importance of the irregularity
not only to the parties but to the functioning of the courts and
in some instances on other considerations of public policy. A liti-
gant who has stipulated to a procedure in excess of jurisdiction
may be estopped to question it when 'To hold otherwise would
permit the parties to trifle with the courts.' On the other hand
waiver of procedural requirements may not be permitted when the
allowance of a deviation would lead to confusion in the processing
of other cases by other litigants. 14 1
Considered in this light, we may assume arguendo that informal
amendment involves a significant departure from the statutory proce-
dures for amendment of accusatory pleadings. However, the "impor-
tance of the irregularity" may be measured by the additional benefits,
if any, to be derived from strictly enforcing the "formal" Penal Code
procedures, -4 2 and the dangers, if any, of informal amendment.
Insofar as the standards applied by the cases which have utilized
the informal amendment process are observed-more particularly, due
process notice, request or stipulation by the defendant, and sufficient
evidence of the lesser crime-the substantial purposes of "formal"
amendment are met, and the trial is "fundamentally fair." Indeed,
to hold otherwise would allow defendants to "trifle with the courts."
Perhaps the only salient argument against informal amendment is that
139. CAL. PEN. CODE § 681 (West 1970). See generally 1 B. WITKJN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction §§ 9-15, at 534-42 (2d ed. 1970).
140. People v. Schoeller, 96 Cal. App. 2d 61, 62, 214 P.2d 565, 566 (1950); cf.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1012 (West 1970).
141. In re Griffin, 67 Cal. 2d 343, 347-48, 431 P.2d 625, 628-29, 62 Cal. Rptr.
1, 4-5 (1967) (citations omitted). But see People v. Wilson, 271 Cal. App. 2d 60,
62, 76 Cal. Rptr. 195, 196 (1969); People v. Titus, 85 Cal. App. 413, 259 P. 465
(1927); and cases cited note 112 supra.
142. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra. Although In re Stanley B.
draws an analogy between "informal amendment" and formal amendment made with
a waiver of defendant's objections, 17 Cal. App. 3d 530, 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. 116, 120
(1971), the differences are manifest.
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in its present state it breeds dangerous confusion because it has not
been clearly enunciated.
Two additional aspects of informal amendment call for brief con-
sideration. Can defendant's conduct result in such an amendment
even if he is not convicted of the unincluded offense? By way of
example, if the accused requests an erroneous lesser instruction, and
it is given by the court, does informal amendment automatically occur,
or is the process reserved only for those occasions on which there is
a conviction based on the request?
Reason and fairness dictate that if informal amendment occurs
at all, it must take place whenever it is possible for an appellate court
to sustain a conviction on the unincluded offense; otherwise, double
jeopardy problems will arise. 143 It has been stated, with logic, that
"[a]s a matter of effective justice, a jurisdiction's lesser of-
fense rule should be co-extensive with its double jeopardy rule.
Double jeopardy is meaningful only insofar as it protects a defend-
ant from subsequent prosecution for an offense for which convic-
tion was possible in the prior proceeding. 44
Another point of interest arose in People v. Roeschlaub when
the court accepted defendant's stipulation on the lesser unincluded of-
fense, despite the refusal of the prosecutor to concur in the action. 145
In effect, this represented a form of plea bargaining between the judge
and the defense, over the head of the district attorney. In addition
to the possible constitutional and statutory objections to such action,' 46
the dangers inherent in this procedure need not be detailed here; it
suffices to say that, in the context of guilty plea bargaining, such a
process has been soundly condemned by numerous courts and legal
scholars. 47
143. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (added 1966); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1023 (West
1970).
144. Note, Submission of Lesser Crimes, 56 COLuM. L. REv. 888, 892 (1956).
145. 21 Cal. App. 3d 874, 878-79, 98 Cal. Rptr. 888, 890-91 (1971).
146. See People v. Municipal Court, Crim. No. 670 (App. Dep't Super. Ct., Ala-
meda County, California, July 24, 1973). In this case, the trial judge accepted a plea
of guilty to a lesser unincluded offense, over the prosecutor's objection. On appeal,
the court referred to People v. Municipal Court, 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 103 Cal. Rptr.
645 (1973) in holding that, as the district attorney is constitutionally the representa-
tive of the people, requirements of due process and separation of powers demand that
criminal proceedings be instituted and approved by him, and the judge is without au-
thority to institute new charges. Thus, the court is acting without jurisdiction in allow-
ing amendment to an unincluded offense without the consent of the prosecutor, or ac-
cepting a guilty plea to such a crime even without formal amendment, and the plea
is void and must be set aside.
147. See generally Ferguson, The Role of the Judge in Plea Bargaining, 15 CRim.
L.Q. 26 (1972); Hoffman, Pled Bargaining and the Role of thd Judge, 53 F.R.D. 499
(1972); Comment Judicial Participation in Guilty Pleas-A Search for Standards, 33
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One final subject, though not crucial to the informal amendment
concept, has been raised by the courts and should be discussed: the
notion that a defendant should simply not be allowed to complain of
an error in his "favor."'14 8 This theory, as developed in a long line
of decisions, was applied to numerous convictions of lesser degrees
than charged in the pleadings,14 9 or of necssarily included crimes.1"
Ultimately, however, People v. Ghione,'5' citing those earlier cases
but disregarding principles of due process and notice, allowed a jury
conviction of battery on a manslaughter information to stand on the
"undisputed evidence," clearly an erroneous conclusion in view of the
Hess rationale.15 2  Fortunately, only one of the informal amendment
decisions cited Ghione,'5' but, as noted above, several of those cases
utilized the "benefit to the defendant" reasoning.'
The hazards of sustaining convictions on this basis were noted
in an incisive law review comment, which observed that, though the
verdict might have been favorable to the accused, the appellate court
usually has no means of determining whether the lesser conviction re-
sulted from jury compassion, confusion, or an inability to convict on
the charged offense coupled with a feeling that the defendant was
culpable nonetheless. Thus, the author concludes, "in view of the fact
that the defendant is now alleging the verdict to be unfavorable," the
tribunal cannot find conviction of the unincluded lesser crime to be
advantageous to him "without first making unjustified assumptions."' 55
U. Prrr. L. REv. 151 (1971); Comment, Judicial Plea Bargaining, 19 STAN. L. REv.
1082 (1967).
148. See text accompanying notes 107-11 supra.
149. E.g., People v. Barnhart, 59 Cal. 381 (1881); People v. Jenkins, 118 Cal.
App. 115, 4 P.2d 799 (1931); People v. Lopez, 21 Cal. App. 188, 131 P. 104 (1913).
150. E.g., People v. Muhlner, 115 Cal. 303, 47 P. 128 (1896); People v. Cota,
53 Cal. App. 2d 455, 127 P.2d 1010 (1942); People v. Blackwood, 35 Cal. App. 2d
728, 96 P-2d 982 (1939).
151. 115 Cal. App. 2d 252, 251 P.2d 997 (1953). "'[E]ven if it be assumed
that the trier of fact erred here . . . defendant cannot invoke reversal on an error
which is favorable to him. An appellant is precluded from complaining that he was
convicted of a lesser offense than the one of which he is guilty according to the undis-
puted evidence . . . .' For this undeserved windfall appellant should be grateful in-
stead of attempting to capitalize on it to escape even a modicum of punishment ....
Id. at 254-55, 251 P.2d at 999 (citations omitted), quoting People v. Powell, 34 Cal.
2d 196, 205-06, 208 P.2d 974, 980 (1949).
152. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
153. People v. Mayes, 262 Cal. App. 2d 195, 200, 68 Cal. Rptr. 476, 480 (1968).
154. See cases cited note 108 supra. Compare Smith v. United States, 360 U.S.
1 (1959). "It is further suggested that it might be in the interests of the defendant
to have the benefit of the speed that can be mustered by the filing of an information
instead of an indictment. While justice should be administered with dispatch, the es-
sential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed." Id. at 10.
155. Comment, Compromise Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 37 NEB. L. REv. 802,
813 (1958).
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When the evidence in the record would clearly sustain a convic-
tion on the charged offense, of course, such a generalization is inappli-
cable, and if the defendant requests a verdict on the lesser crime, it
is fair to hold him to his apparent belief-at that time-that such a
conviction would be favorable. Nevertheless, the above observation
is plainly relevant in cases wherein a mere failure to object, or an
overruled objection, results in a verdict on the unincluded offense, in-
dicating the need of a more accurate analysis of the "benefit" accorded
the "lucky" defendant in such cases. Even when the defense affirma-
tively invites the conviction, it may be fallacious to speak of a "benefit"
if there is not sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that a guilty
verdict on the greater crime could be supported; while informal
amendment may nonetheless be appropriate, it adds nothing to such




This is not meant to imply that the process of informal amend-
ment is never advantageous to the defendant; quite to the contrary,
it seems clear that, like guilty plea bargaining, the procedure can bene-
fit both the state and the accused. The dangers of the present system,
however, inhere in its informality; without straightforward exposition
by judiciary or legislature, it is of little use to the practitioner and
may, indeed, be a trap for those who have not mastered the often
puzzling nuances of included offenses.
Guilty Pleas to Unincluded Offenses
When a defendant pleads not guilty, a trial court lacks juris-
diction to convict him of an offense that is neither charged nor
necessarily included in the alleged crime. If this constitutional
principle were to be applied to plea bargains, the restrictions could
prevent a defendant from pleading guilty to an offense less serious
than the original charge, despite the prosecutor's willingness to ac-
cept the lesser plea.
157
Scholars in the burgeoning field of commentary on plea bargain-
ing" 5 have remarked upon the desirability of permitting the defendant
to plead guilty to what a leading authority in the area has termed "il-
logical lesser offenses.""'5 Although a discussion of the merits of the
controversial plea negotiation issue is certainly beyond the scope of
this note, it must be observed that charge reduction of several va-
rieties-including dismissal of certain charges in a multi-count accusa-
156. See, e.g., the two ludicrous cases noted in NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 101,
in which the defendants pleaded guilty to crimes which they could not possibly have
committed under the circumstances. See also cases cited note 53 supra.
157. WrrmN, supra note 28, § 262(C), at 147 (Supp. 1973).
158. See generally the articles cited in note 44 supra.
159. NEwmAN, supra note 44, at 99-100. "'[I]nconsistent' would perhaps be a
more accurate term. . . ." Id. at 100.
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tion, or pleas to lesser degrees or included offenses-apparently is
common, 160 and decreases to related but unincluded offenses may also
be a standard practice.' The additional sentencing flexibility, in ad-
dition to the greater volume of guilty pleas, provided by a broader
range of bargaining possibilities is logically adduced in support of such
processes in this day of "[i]ndividualiz[ing] criminal justice."'
1 62
Thus, in 1970 the California Supreme Court, in People v.
West,"'63 a decision far more often cited for its treatment of the plea
bargaining process in general,' 64 held that a "court may accept a bar-
gained plea of guilty or nole contendere to any lesser offense reas-
onably related to the offense charged in the accusatory pleading. "165
The defendant in the case, a narcotics matter, had pleaded nolo
contendere to an unincluded crime following a bargain with the pros-
ecutor; defense counsel and the deputy district attorney stipulated that,
for the purposes of the present action, the offense to which defendant
was pleading would be considered a lesser included of the one
charged.' 6 6 The trial court accepted the plea and pronounced sen-
tence thereon, but the defendant appealed on the basis of the denial
of his motion to suppress certain evidence. 161  The appellate tribunal,
on its own motion and without so much as mentioning informal amend-
ment, reversed, stating simply that the offense was not necessarily in-
cluded, and the trial court was therefore without jurisdiction to accept
160. NEWMAN, supra note 44, passim; Comment, Judicial Supervision, supra note
44, at 962-68.
161. NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 100; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 44, at 68 (com-
mentary to § 3.1(b)) (citing NEWMAN); People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 613, 477 P.2d
409, 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 396 (1970) (citing NEWMAN and ABA STANDARDS).
162. NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 112, ch. 8. See generally People v. West, 3 Cal.
3d 595, 605, 477 P.2d 409, 414, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 390 (1970); NEWMAN, supra note
44, at 99-104, 112-30; Judicial Supervision, supra note 44.
163. 3 CaL 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
164. The court undertook to "confirm the legality of plea bargaining and to set
up procedures for its acceptance or rejection in the strong light of full disclosure." Id.
at 599, 477 P.2d at 410, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
165. Id. at 611, 477 P.2d at 419, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 395; cf. Paterno v. Lyons, 334
U.S. 314, 321-22 (1948). Contra, Williams v. Turner, 421 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1970);
State v. Claytor, 3 Ariz. App. 226, 413 P.2d 285 (1966); People v. Whitlow, 113 Cal.
App. 2d 804, 249 P.2d 35 (1952); State v. Minton, 276 Minn. 213, 149 N.W.2d 384
(1967).
166. The supreme court expressly declined to determine the effect of this stipula-
tion. 3 Cal. 3d at 613 n.21, 477 P.2d at 420 n.21, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 396 n.21. "We
realize, of course, that by appropriate stipulations followed by a guilty plea, the People
and a defendant, with the concurrence of the court, can dispose of a charge in almost
any fashion they like, however remote from the crime to which he pleads the defend-
ant's acts may have been." People v. Wilson, 271 Cal. App. 2d 60, 63, 76 Cal. Rptr.
195, 197 (1969) (dictum).
167. 3 Cal. 3d at 599, 477 P.2d at 410, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
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such a plea. 68
The supreme court, after a comprehensive analysis of the plea
bargaining process and some specific directives regarding its proper
utilization, noted several of the informal amendment cases and the no-
tions of notice, due process, and consent contained therein.16 9 In con-
clusion, however, the court traveled beyond this theory, and rested
its decision on new ground:
Although we could speak of defendant's plea as an 'implied'
amendment of the information to add the charge to which defend-
ant pleads, we see no need to fashion such a fiction; we hold that
the court, in accepting a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, is not limited in its jurisdiction to the offenses
charged or necessarily included in those charged.'
1 0
West and Informal Amendment
It should be observed that although the court elected not to utilize
the informal amendment concept, the factual situation of the case cer-
tainly exhibited attributes of the Hensel-type cases,171 as the court
noted. As regards notice, the tribunal stated that, "[a] defendant who
knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty of nolo contendere can hardly
claim that he is unaware that he might be convicted of the offense
to which he pleads .... "172 The plea itself, of course, satisfied
the "request" standard of the "informal amendment" decisions. Fur-
ther analogy may be drawn to the presence of counsel, and the ra-
tionale that in West, as in the cases implying amendment, the plead-
ings could have been formally amended with consent of the defendant.
Indeed, the only significant departure from the informal amendment
theory in West regards the evidence-or lack thereof-in support of
the plea;'173 therein lie the basic unanswered questions concerning the
"related offenses" principle.
The West Criteria: Search for Standards
In delimiting the permissible scope of the new rule, the supreme
court adopted the standard suggested by the American Bar Associa-
tion, 74 restricting the range of downgrading to offenses "reasonably
168. 3 Cal. App. 3d 386, 83 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1970).
169. 3 Cal. 3d at 612-13, 477 P.2d at 419-20, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
170. Id. at 612-13, 477 P.2d at 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (citation omitted). Com-
pare People ex rel. Prince v. Brophy, 273 N.Y. 90, 6 N.E.2d 109 (1937), rehearing
denied, 278 N.Y. 704, 16 N.E.2d 851 (1938) (utilizing the "implied amendment" the-
ory in a similar situation).
171. See text accompanying notes 80-111 supra.
172. 3 Cal. 3d at 612, 477 P.2d at 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
173. Id. at 603, 477 P.2d at 413, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
174. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 44, § 3.1(b) (ii) at 60.
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related to defendant's conduct" and the crime charged. 175  Such a re-
lationship was said to exist "when (1) the defendant pleads to the
same type of offense as that charged . . . or (2) when he pleads
to an offense which he may have committed during the course of con-
duct which led to the charge.'
176
The West court found that the first prong of the test had been
met in the case under consideration, insofar as both the violation
charged and that to which the defendant pleaded involved restricted
drugs.' 77  This obviously left the standard rather vague, though per-
haps intentionally so;1 71 nonetheless, not a single appellate decision
has since appeared to aid interpretation, and neither of the authorities
from whom West drew to support the practice 79 provides any more
practical definition.
A related aspect of the limitations on charge reduction, however,
may supply some direction, even though it has received scant attention
in California courts. Need there be a factual basis for the plea in
the defendant's actual conduct, as is required in the federal system? 8 °
175. 3 Cal. 3d at 613, 477 P.2d at 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 396; cf. COMMIrEE
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CRIMINAL RULES ll(e)(1) (1973) ("The at-
torney for the government and the attorney for the defendant may engage in discus-
sions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense .... ")
(emphasis added). But see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 44, at 68 (Commentary to
§ 3.1(b)) ("the reason is that instances may arise in which a concession as to the
charge would be appropriate but no lesser included or lesser degree offense is avail-
able.").
176. 3 Cal. 3d at 613, 477 P.2d at 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (noting the use
of the term "categoric similarity" by NEWMAN and ABA STANDARDS).
177. Id. at 613, 477 P.2d at 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
178. "[W]e would be loath to reduce [the usefulness of plea bargaining] by con-
fining it within the straightjacket of 'necessarily included offenses'." Id. at 613, 477
P.2d at 421, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
179. 3 Cal. 3d at 613, 477 P.2d at 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (NEWMAN and ABA
STANDARDS).
180. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 247 (1969)
(Harlan and Black, JJ., dissenting) (implying that the majority opinion substantially
applies the standards of rule 11 to the states as a matter of constitutional due process);
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) (holding, without reaching the
constitutional issue, that failure of a federal court to strictly apply the rule was reversi-
ble error). Although the fears of the Boykin dissent may be unfounded-i.e., the full
requirements of rule 11 are not a mandate for state courts, Freeman v. Page, 443 F.2d
493, 497 (10th Cir. 1971); Arbuckle v. Turner, 440 F.2d 586, 589 n.4 (10th Cir.
1971)-it is noteworthy that many states have provisions similar to McCarthy and the
federal rules; see, e.g., State v. Durham, 108 Ariz. 327, 498 P.2d 149 (1972); People
v. Taylor, 387 Mich. 209, 195 N.W.2d 856 (1972); State v. Spahn, 289 Minn. 497,
182 N.W.2d 873 (1970); Commonwealth v. Maddox, 450 Pa. 406, 300 A.2d 503
(1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 402(c) (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3210(4) (Supp. 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.35 (Supp. 1972); 42A Wisc. STAT.
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Or is another standard suggested by West, wherein "no evidence in the
record indicated defendant's guilt" of the lesser unincluded offense?"'
Is it sufficient in California that, as stated in West, the defendant's
record merely "not be grossly misleading," and thus unlikely to even-
tuate "inappropriate correctional treatment or police suspicion"?
8 2
It should of course be recognized that a plea of guilty properly
received obviates any necessity for the prosecution to present evi-
dence, as the plea itself is an implied admission that every element
of the offense has been, or could be, established. 8 Thus, the de-
fendant cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal' 8 4
However, this does not meet the preliminary problem regarding proper
reception of the plea by the court in the first instance.
While it is not necessarily desirable either that pleas be "on the
nose" or that courts scrutinize the evidence in support of a guilty plea
to the same extent as if the defendant had elected to go to trial, 85
it must be recognized that the willingness of an accused to plead
guilty is no particular guaranty of the accuracy of the plea.8 6 The
§ 971.08(1) (b) (1971); ALAS. R. Cnsm. P. 11, Auz. R. CIuM. P. 17.3; cf. Bishop,
Rights and Responsibilities of the Defendant Pleading Guilty, 49 J. URBAN L. 1, 49
(1971) ("in all jurisdictions, in order to be valid, a guilty pleas must be ... factually
supported to establish the crime and the defendant's participation therein"). See gen-
erally 8 1. MOORE, FEDmL PRACrrcn [ 11.03[4], at 11-62 (1973); R. Hayden & W.
KEENE, CALrFORNri SUPERIOR COURT TAL JUDGES' BENCHBOOK 19-26 (1973). "Before
entering judgment, [a judge] must determine that there is a factual basis for the [guilty]
plea." Id. at 19.
181. 3 Cal. 3d at 603, 477 P.2d at 413, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
182. Id. at 613, 477 P.2d at 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (quoting ABA STANDARDS).
"inhere probably should be no downgrading to 'illogical' lesser offenses where the
actual charge bears no relationship to the criminal conduct of the offender involved.
In short, there must be some range set to permissible downgrading no matter how noble
the motive of the prosecutor and the court." Newman & NeMoyer, Issues of Propriety
in Negotiated Justice, 47 DENVER L.J. 367, 404 (1970).
183. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra; cf. People v. Ward, 66 Cal.
2d 571, 574, 426 P.2d 881, 883, 58 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (1967).
184. Cf. People v. Martin, 9 Cal. 3d 687, 693, 511 P.2d 1161, 1165, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 809, 813 (1973); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1237.5 (West 1970).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400, 403 (1st Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 958 (1971) (judge may question defendant, and require prosecutor
to outline the evidence); Lupo v. United States, 435 F.2d 519, 524-25 (8th Cir. 1970)
(factual basis contained in evidence in presentence report). Compare ALA. CODE tit.
15, § 277 (Cum. Supp. 1972) (court may call witnesses to examine character of of-
fense), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2310 (Cum. Supp. 1972) (jury hears evidence
to determine penalty, if not fixed by law), and TEx. CODE Cam. PROc. art. 26.14
(1966) (in felony cases, jury hears evidence to determine penalty, if not fixed by law).
See generally PRESDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
oP JusncE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 13 (1967); Comment, The Trial
Judge's Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 306
(1966).
186. NEwMAN, supra note 44, at 233.
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question presented, then, is whether there is any need to compare
the defendant's actual behavior with the elements of the offense to
which he offers a plea."'
Section 1192.5 of the California Penal Code, discussed in
West, 88 provides for the specification of punishment in bargained
pleas of guilty or nolo contendere.189  The supreme court fully set
forth the section (which had taken effect only the previous month)
in a footnote in West,'90 and stated that the procedure provided
therein (and in the section's predecessor, 1192.3), though not appli-
cable on the facts of the immediate case, provided "guidelines which
the trial court can utilize in receiving and considering plea bargains
involving pleas to lesser offenses."' 9 '
In this context, it is striking that section 1192.5 asserts,
If the court approves of the plea, it shall . . . also cause an
inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea
is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis
for such plea.192 (emphasis added)
This is consistent with the federal standard;' 93 further, both Professor
Donald Newman'94 and the ABA committee, 95 upon whom the West
decision relied in formulating the "related offenses" position, 9 6 rec-
ommend a factual inquiry similar to the federal practice. This is not
to say that the court must conduct a full evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine that defendant's conduct precisely matches the plea; 197 however,
the court should determine that the facts will in some manner support
the "conviction." ABA Standards, in separate reports, suggest two pos-
sibilities:
[T]hat the defendant actually committed a crime at least as se-
rious as the one to which he is willing to plead; 98
or:
[Tihat the accused admits facts which would be sufficient to sup-
187. See note 166 supra.
188. 3 Cal. 3d at 607 n.l1, 477 P.2d at 416 n.1l, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 392 n.1l.
189. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1192.5 (West Supp. 1973).
190. 3 Cal. 3d at 607 n.11, 477 P.2d at 416 n.11, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 392 n.11.
191. Id. at 608, 477 P.2d at 416-17, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
192. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1192.5 (West Supp. 1973).
193. See note 180 supra.
194. NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 10, 21.
195. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 44, § 1.6 at 30.
196. 3 Cal. 3d at 613, 477 P.2d at 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
197. See, e.g., cases cited note 185 supra, and procedures described in NEWMAN,
supra note 44, at 19-25. Nor, however, should the court rely on a mere statement by
defense counsel that a factual basis exists, United States v. Tucker, 425 F.2d 624 (4th
Cir. 1970), or the mere allegations of the accusatory pleading, United States v. Cody,
438 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1971).
198. ABA STANDnARs, supra note 44, at 33 (commentary to § 1.6).
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port a guilty verdict on the charge to which he pleads or to a
greater charge.199
Clearly the second standard is more exacting, and would result in a
narrower range of bargaining possibilities; yet, in choosing a position
for the California courts, it is worthwhile to bear in mind Newman's
assertion that "raw administrative efficiency is not and has never been
a mark of proper justice administration. '20 0  Did the supreme court,
in West, intend that a court of appeals should bluntly state, shortly
thereafter, that,
The possibility that a defendant is submitting to criminal punish-
ment for an offense of which he claims he is not in fact criminally
responsible is no longer an obstacle now that plea bargaining and
acceptance of a guilty plea to a lesser offense of which such de-
fendant may not in fact be guilty has been approved in People
v. West with the safeguards there described?
201
Whether or not this was West's intention, a "factual basis" policy
should be clearly enunciated.
Conclusion
The potential utility of both of the above-described devices in effec-
tive criminal justice administration-in terms of sentencing individuali-
zation, increased trial court efficiency, and, hopefully, decreased ap-
pellate litigation-should be manifest. However, without the safe-
guard of adequate, intelligible guidelines, informal amendment and
"related offenses" are likely to encourage only increased confusion and
controversy in the central arena of the superior court. Although the
judiciary has made a positive contribution without the aid of statutory
direction or authority, legislative assistance in both areas is plainly war-
ranted.
The Statutory Solution
A statute concerning informal amendments should contain three
basic requirements. First, that the defendant, prior to a verdict on the
unincluded lesser offense, clearly have had notice of, and an oppor-
tunity to present defenses (if any) on, both that crime and the one(s)
charged. Second, that the defendant have requested and acquiesced
in his conviction upon the lesser offense. While, in a sense, allowing
199. ABA PfoJ Er oN MINIUM STANDARDS FOR CRmAL YUSUnCE, STANDARs
RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTON § 4.2, at 108
(Approved Draft 1971).
200. NEWMAN, supra note 44, at 234; cf. ABA STANDARDs, supra note 44, at 32-
33 (commentary to § 1.6).
201. People v. Redmond, 16 Cal. App. 3d 931, 938-39, 94 Cal. Rptr. 543, 548
(1971) (citation omitted). The safeguards are, apparently, the provisions for candid
disclosure of bargains and recordation thereof.
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the request to satisfy the notice requirement is "bootstrapping," the
precaution of providing that the defendant actually invite his convic-
tion, rather than merely consent to it, should adequately assure that
due process is observed. Third, there must be factual evidence before
the court sufficient to support the verdict rendered.
Additionally, the legislation should provide that, whenever the
first two portions of the above standard are fulfilled and the record
shows that the parties and the court accepted the unincluded offense
as an issue upon which conviction was possible, "informal amendment"
has occurred. Obviously, this will be more evident in situations involv-
ing requested instructions or accepted stipulations than in cases
wherein only an informal discussion between counsel and the court
appears; nevertheless, fairness to the defendant and principles of
double jeopardy demand nothing less than this degree of mutuality.
The "lesser related offenses" problem is more troublesome, al-
though the federal rules committee has already proposed an enactment
similar to the ABA standard.20 2  It may be that no legislative pro-
nouncement could satisfactorily deal with the myriad possibilities in-
herent in such a scheme; this is not reason enough to avoid the subject
entirely. At the least, a factual inquiry of some sort is needed,20 3
if not constitutionally mandated;2 4 as experience under the federal
standards indicates, numerous modes of examination will accomplish
this purpose, and, apparently, not unduly burden the criminal justice
system.205 Even the uncertain relational limitations described in West
certainly recognize the necessity of boundaries to downgrading. Re-
search into present practices in other jurisdictions and into workable,
yet judicially sound, restrictions is called for in this area. Hopefully,
the legislature will act to render both of this latently useful doctrines
more certain, and thereby more profitable for defendants, district attor-
neys, and the courts.
Robert J. Russell*
202. See note 175 supra.
203. The author is aware that many practitioners undoubtedly feel that a defend-
ant and prosecutor, with the concurrence of the trial court, should be allowed to reach
whatever bargain they may, without regard to the defendant's actual conduct as a rigid
restriction, but rather as one factor to be considered. See note 166 supra.
204. See note 180 supra.
205. See, e.g., cases cited note 185 supra.
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